

Frame-based Completeness of Intermediate Logics

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17 February 2006

Abstract

In this paper, the duality between descriptive frames and Heyting algebras is proved in detail. This, together with the standard result on the completeness of intermediate logics with respect to Heyting algebras, is used to obtain the completeness of intermediate logics with respect to descriptive frames.

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1 Introduction

It is well known that propositional logics are complete with respect to the appropriate algebraic semantics. For example, classical propositional logic (**CPC**) is complete with respect to the class of Boolean algebras and intuitionistic propositional logic (**IPC**) is complete with respect to the class of Heyting algebras. These proofs can be modified to obtain similar results about certain classes of extensions. For example, every modal logic (which can be considered an extension of **CPC**) is complete with respect to a certain class of Boolean algebras with operators. And every intermediate logic (which is an extension of **IPC**) is complete with respect to a certain class of Heyting algebras.

Some would prefer, however, completeness with respect to a frame-based semantics. This can be done easily in the cases of **CPC** (which is complete with respect to the single reflexive point) and **IPC** (which is complete with respect to Kripke frames). Similar results can be obtained for particular extensions. (For example, **S4**, an extension of **CPC**, is complete with respect to reflexive, transitive Kripke frames.) But this cannot be done directly for all extensions, so a new method is needed. The new method relies on a broader notion of frame which provides a link to the algebraic semantics. In the case of modal logics, this notion is that of the general frame, and the link with algebraic semantics comes in the form of the Stone Representation Theorem. The final result is that every modal logic is complete with respect to a certain class of general frames.

The goal of this paper is to prove the result for intermediate logics analogous to the one just mentioned for modal logics. That is, we will prove the completeness of intermediate logics with respect to frame-based semantics. We will do this by introducing the notion of a descriptive frame, relating these to Heyting algebras, and then transferring the completeness from the algebraic side to the frame-based side.

2 Preliminaries

In this section, we introduce the preliminary notions needed for the proof, along with some results to be assumed.

2.1 Logics, Frames, and Algebras

We here recall some familiar definitions, mainly to set the notation for the rest of the paper.

Definition 2.1.1. *The intuitionistic propositional calculus **IPC** is the smallest set of formulas (of a propositional language \mathcal{L} containing $\vee, \wedge, \rightarrow, \perp$, and infinitely many propositional letters PROP) containing*

1. $p \rightarrow (q \rightarrow p)$,
2. $(p \rightarrow (q \rightarrow r)) \rightarrow ((p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow (p \rightarrow r))$,

3. $p \wedge q \rightarrow p$,
4. $p \wedge q \rightarrow q$,
5. $p \rightarrow p \vee q$,
6. $q \rightarrow p \vee q$,
7. $(p \rightarrow r) \rightarrow ((q \rightarrow r) \rightarrow ((p \vee q) \rightarrow r))$,
8. $\perp \rightarrow p$,

and closed under modus ponens and substitution.

The logics we will be concerned with in this paper are extensions of intuitionistic logic:

Definition 2.1.2. *An intermediate logic is any consistent (i.e., not containing \perp) logic (i.e., set of formulas closed under modus ponens and substitution) of \mathcal{L} containing **IPC**.*

The intuitive semantics for modal and intuitionistic logics is based on Kripke frames.

Definition 2.1.3. *An intuitionistic Kripke frame is a pair $\mathfrak{F} = (W, R)$ where R is a partial order on $W \neq \emptyset$. An intuitionistic Kripke model is a pair $\mathfrak{M} = (\mathfrak{F}, V)$ where $\mathfrak{F} = (W, R)$ is a Kripke frame and V , an intuitionistic valuation, is a map from **PROP** to*

$$Up(\mathfrak{F}) = \{X \in \mathcal{P}(W) : w \in X \wedge wRv \rightarrow v \in X\},$$

the upsets of \mathfrak{F} .

The notions of truth and validity are standard, except for the implication clause of the truth definition.

Definition 2.1.4. *We define by recursion φ is true in \mathfrak{M} at w (notation $\mathfrak{M}, w \models \varphi$):*

1. $\mathfrak{M}, w \models p$ iff $w \in V(p)$,
2. $\mathfrak{M}, w \models \varphi \wedge \psi$ iff $\mathfrak{M}, w \models \varphi$ and $\mathfrak{M}, w \models \psi$,
3. $\mathfrak{M}, w \models \varphi \vee \psi$ iff $\mathfrak{M}, w \models \varphi$ or $\mathfrak{M}, w \models \psi$,
4. $\mathfrak{M}, w \models \varphi \rightarrow \psi$ iff for all v such that wRv , if $\mathfrak{M}, v \models \varphi$ then $\mathfrak{M}, v \models \psi$,
5. $\mathfrak{M}, w \not\models \perp$.

We say that φ is valid on a frame \mathfrak{F} , and write $\mathfrak{F} \models \varphi$, if $(\mathfrak{F}, V), w \models \varphi$ for every valuation V and world w .

With the frame-based semantics in hand, we now recall the algebraic semantics.

Definition 2.1.5. A structure $\mathfrak{A} = (A, \vee, \wedge, \rightarrow, \perp, \top)$ is a Heyting algebra iff $A \neq \emptyset$, \vee , \wedge , and \rightarrow are binary operations on A , and $\perp, \top \in A$ such that for every $a, b, c \in A$:

(i) \mathfrak{A} is a bounded lattice:

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. $a \vee a = a$, | $a \wedge a = a$, |
| 2. $a \vee b = b \vee a$, | $a \wedge b = a \wedge b$, |
| 3. $a \vee (b \vee c) = (a \vee b) \vee c$, | $a \wedge (b \wedge c) = (a \wedge b) \wedge c$, |
| 4. $a \vee \perp = a$, | $a \wedge \top = a$, |
| 5. $a \vee (b \wedge a) = a$, | $a \wedge (b \vee a) = a$, |

(ii) \mathfrak{A} is distributive:

1. $a \vee (b \wedge c) = (a \vee b) \wedge (a \vee c)$,
2. $a \wedge (b \vee c) = (a \wedge b) \vee (a \wedge c)$,

(iii) and \rightarrow is Heyting implication:

1. $a \rightarrow a = \top$,
2. $a \wedge (a \rightarrow b) = a \wedge b$,
3. $b \wedge (a \rightarrow b) = b$,
4. $a \rightarrow (b \wedge c) = (a \rightarrow b) \wedge (a \rightarrow c)$.

A useful semantic characterization of Heyting implication is

$$c \leq a \rightarrow b \text{ iff } a \wedge c \leq b$$

where $a \leq b$ iff $a \wedge b = a$ (see [3, Theorem 7.10]). To define truth in a Heyting algebra \mathfrak{A} , we define a valuation $v : \text{PROP} \rightarrow A$ and extend it to all formulas of \mathcal{L} by the obvious recursion. Then

Definition 2.1.6. φ is valid in \mathfrak{A} iff $v(\varphi) = \top$ for every valuation v .

One last notion that will be needed is that of a filter.

Definition 2.1.7. Let \mathfrak{A} be a Heyting algebra. A nonempty, proper subset $F \subset A$ is a filter of \mathfrak{A} if

1. $a, b \in F$ implies $a \wedge b \in F$,
2. $a \in F$ and $a \leq b$ implies $b \in F$,

and a prime filter if in addition:

3. $a \vee b \in F$ implies $a \in F$ or $b \in F$.

A sometimes useful equivalent (see [3, Theorem 7.23]) definition of filter replaces conditions 1 and 2 with $\top \in F$ and

$$a \in F \text{ and } a \rightarrow b \in F \text{ implies } b \in F.$$

We state here a result, sometimes referred to as the Prime Filter Theorem, about filters that will be needed in §3. It is a minor generalization of [3, Theorem 7.41].

Proposition 2.1.8. *Let F be a filter of \mathfrak{A} and $X \subset A$ such that $F \cap X = \emptyset$. Then there is a prime filter F' of \mathfrak{A} such that $F \subseteq F'$ and $F' \cap X = \emptyset$.*

2.2 Algebraic Completeness

We can associate to each intermediate logic L the class \mathbf{V}_L of those Heyting algebras in which all theorems of L are valid. \mathbf{V}_L will be a variety by Birkhoff's Theorem, which states that a class of algebras is equationally defined iff it is a variety. Then, by a Lindenbaum-Tarski type construction, the following can be proved (as in [3, Theorem 7.73(iv)]).

Theorem 2.2.1. *Every intermediate logic L is sound and complete with respect to \mathbf{V}_L .*

This gives us the completeness with respect to algebraic semantics that we will try to transfer to the frame-based semantics. Before we can do that, though, we must define the frame-based semantics.

2.3 Descriptive Frames

We define here the notion that will give us an adequate frame-based semantics for completeness. It is a generalization of the Kripke frame:

Definition 2.3.1. *An intuitionistic general frame is a triple $\mathfrak{F} = (W, R, \mathcal{P})$ where (W, R) is a Kripke frame, $\mathcal{P} \subseteq \text{Up}(\mathfrak{F})$ containing \emptyset and W , and \mathcal{P} is closed under \cup , \cap , and \rightarrow defined by*

$$U_1 \rightarrow U_2 := \{w \in W : \forall v (wRv \wedge v \in U_1 \rightarrow v \in U_2)\} = W \setminus R^{-1}(U_1 \setminus U_2),$$

where $R^{-1}(U) = \bigcup_{w \in U} \{v \in W : vRw\}$.

Definition 2.3.2. *An intuitionistic descriptive frame is a general frame that is refined and compact, where:*

1. \mathfrak{F} is refined if for every $w, v \in W$, $\neg(wRv)$ implies that there is $U \in \mathcal{P}$ such that $w \in U$ and $v \notin U$, and
2. \mathfrak{F} is compact if for every $\mathcal{X} \subseteq \mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{Y} \subseteq \{W \setminus U : U \in \mathcal{P}\}$, if $\mathcal{X} \cup \mathcal{Y}$ has the finite intersection property then $\bigcap(\mathcal{X} \cup \mathcal{Y}) \neq \emptyset$.

Definition 2.3.3. *An intuitionistic descriptive model is a pair $\mathfrak{M} = (\mathfrak{F}, V)$ such that $\mathfrak{F} = (W, R, \mathcal{P})$ is a descriptive frame and $V : \text{PROP} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}$.*

Truth and validity are defined as usual.

3 Duality

In this section, we prove a duality theorem for Heyting algebras and descriptive frames. This will provide us with the link needed to infer frame-based completeness from algebraic completeness.

3.1 From Frames to Algebras

We first define an operator $*$ from descriptive frames to Heyting algebras.

Definition 3.1.1. *Let $\mathfrak{F} = (W, R, \mathcal{P})$ be a descriptive frame. Then $\mathfrak{F}^* := (\mathcal{P}, \cup, \cap, \rightarrow, \emptyset, W)$ (where \rightarrow is the operation on \mathcal{P} defined in the previous section).*

Lemma 3.1.2. *For every descriptive frame \mathfrak{F} , \mathfrak{F}^* is a Heyting algebra.*

Proof. That \mathfrak{F}^* is a distributive lattice follows directly from the fact that any set of sets forms a distributive lattice. So we only need to show that \rightarrow satisfies the axioms for Heyting implication. Let $X, Y, Z \in \mathcal{P} \subset Up(\mathfrak{F})$.

1. $a \rightarrow a = \top$:

$$\begin{aligned} X \rightarrow X &= W \setminus R^{-1}(X \setminus X) \\ &= W \setminus R^{-1}(\emptyset) \\ &= W \setminus \emptyset \\ &= W. \end{aligned}$$

2. $a \wedge (a \rightarrow b) = a \wedge b$:

$$\begin{aligned} X \cap (X \rightarrow Y) &= X \cap (W \setminus R^{-1}(X \setminus Y)) \\ &= X \setminus R^{-1}(X \setminus Y) \\ &= X \cap Y. \end{aligned}$$

To see that the last equality holds, notice that if $w \in X \cap Y$, then $u \in Y$ if wRu , since Y is an upset. So $\neg wRu$ for any $u \in X \setminus Y$. For the other containment, let $w \in X$ and $w \notin R^{-1}(X \setminus Y)$. Then $w \notin X \setminus Y$, since R is reflexive, showing that $w \in Y$.

3. $b \wedge (a \rightarrow b) = b$:

$$\begin{aligned} Y \cap (X \rightarrow Y) &= Y \cap (W \setminus R^{-1}(X \setminus Y)) \\ &= Y \setminus R^{-1}(X \setminus Y) \\ &= Y, \end{aligned}$$

where the last equality holds because $Y \cap R^{-1}(X \setminus Y) = \emptyset$, since Y is an upset.

4. $a \rightarrow (b \wedge c) = (a \rightarrow b) \wedge (a \rightarrow c)$:

$$\begin{aligned}
W \setminus R^{-1}(X \setminus (Y \cap Z)) &= W \setminus R^{-1}((X \setminus Y) \cup (X \setminus Z)) \\
&= W \setminus (R^{-1}(X \setminus Y) \cup R^{-1}(X \setminus Z)) \\
&= W \setminus R^{-1}(X \setminus Y) \cap W \setminus R^{-1}(X \setminus Z) \\
&= (X \rightarrow Y) \wedge (X \rightarrow Z).
\end{aligned}$$

The second equality holds because

$$\begin{aligned}
w \in R^{-1}((X \setminus Y) \cup (X \setminus Z)) &\text{ iff } \exists u \in (X \setminus Y) \cup (X \setminus Z) : wRu \\
&\text{ iff } \exists u \in X \setminus Y : wRu \text{ or } \exists u \in X \setminus Z : wRu \\
&\text{ iff } w \in R^{-1}(X \setminus Y) \text{ or } w \in R^{-1}(X \setminus Z).
\end{aligned}$$

Therefore \mathfrak{F}^* is a Heyting algebra. □

Note that we didn't use that \mathfrak{A} was descriptive. This works for general frames as well, but the importance of using descriptive frames will become clear in the proof of Theorem 3.3.1.

3.2 From Algebras to Frames

Now we define an operator $*$ in the other direction.

Definition 3.2.1. Let $\mathfrak{A} = (A, \vee, \wedge, \rightarrow, \perp, \top)$ be a Heyting algebra.

1. $W_{\mathfrak{A}} = \{F \subset A : F \text{ is a prime filter of } \mathfrak{A}\},$
2. $FR_{\mathfrak{A}}F' \text{ iff } F \subseteq F',$
3. $\mathcal{P}_{\mathfrak{A}} = \{\hat{a} : a \in A\} \text{ where } \hat{a} = \{F \in W_{\mathfrak{A}} : a \in F\}.$

Then $\mathfrak{A}_* := (W_{\mathfrak{A}}, R_{\mathfrak{A}}, \mathcal{P}_{\mathfrak{A}}).$

Lemma 3.2.2. For every Heyting algebra \mathfrak{A} , \mathfrak{A}_* is a descriptive frame.

Proof. That $R_{\mathfrak{A}}$ is a partial order, and hence that $\mathfrak{F}_{\mathfrak{A}} := (W_{\mathfrak{A}}, R_{\mathfrak{A}})$ is a Kripke frame, follows directly from the fact that \subseteq is a partial order on sets. If $F \in \hat{a}$ and $FR_{\mathfrak{A}}F'$, then $a \in F$ and $F \subseteq F'$, and so $a \in F'$ and $F' \in \hat{a}$. So each \hat{a} is an upset of $F_{\mathfrak{A}}$, giving us $\mathcal{P}_{\mathfrak{A}} \subseteq Up(\mathfrak{F}_{\mathfrak{A}})$. Because filters are upsets, $\perp \notin F$ (else $F = A$, contradicting that filters are proper) and $\top \in F$ (else $F = \emptyset$, contradicting that filters are nonempty) for every (prime) filter F . Thus $\hat{\perp} = \emptyset$ and $\hat{\top} = W_{\mathfrak{A}}$ are in $\mathcal{P}_{\mathfrak{A}}$.

We next have to check that \mathcal{P}_A is closed under \cup , \cap , and \rightarrow . Let $\widehat{a}, \widehat{b} \in \mathcal{P}_A$. Then

$$\begin{aligned}\widehat{a} \cup \widehat{b} &= \{F \in W_A : a \in F\} \cup \{F \in W_A : b \in F\} \\ &= \{F \in W_A : a \in F \text{ or } b \in F\} \\ &= \{F \in W_A : a \vee b \in F\} \\ &= \widehat{a \vee b} \\ &\in \mathcal{P}_A,\end{aligned}$$

where the third equality holds because F is a prime filter. Also

$$\begin{aligned}\widehat{a} \cap \widehat{b} &= \{F \in W_A : a \in F\} \cap \{F \in W_A : b \in F\} \\ &= \{F \in W_A : a \in F \text{ and } b \in F\} \\ &= \{F \in W_A : a \wedge b \in F\} \\ &= \widehat{a \wedge b} \\ &\in \mathcal{P}_A,\end{aligned}$$

where the third equality holds because F is a filter. And in the definition of descriptive frame, we defined \rightarrow precisely to make the following work:

$$\begin{aligned}\widehat{a} \rightarrow \widehat{b} &= \{F \in W_A : \forall F' (FR_A F' \wedge F' \in \widehat{a} \rightarrow F' \in \widehat{b})\} \\ &= \{F \in W_A : \forall F' (F \subseteq F' \wedge a \in F' \rightarrow b \in F')\} \\ &= \widehat{a \rightarrow b} \\ &\in \mathcal{P}_A.\end{aligned}$$

To show the right is contained in the left in the last equality, let $F \in \widehat{a \rightarrow b}$ and suppose that $F \subseteq F'$ with $a \in F'$. Then, as $a \rightarrow b \in F$, $a \rightarrow b \in F'$. And so, as F' is a filter containing a , $b \in F'$. Thus $F \in \{F \in W_A : \forall F' (F \subseteq F' \wedge a \in F' \rightarrow b \in F')\}$. For the reverse containment, let $F \in \{F \in W_A : \forall F' (F \subseteq F' \wedge a \in F' \rightarrow b \in F')\}$. We want to show that $a \rightarrow b \in F$. If $b \in F$, then $a \rightarrow b \in F$, so we suppose $b \notin F$. If there is $c \in F$ such that $c \wedge a = 0$, then $c \wedge a \leq b$, so $c \leq a \rightarrow b$ by the semantic characterization of \rightarrow , and so $a \rightarrow b \in F$. So assume there is no such c . Let F_a be the filter generated by F and a .¹ This exists since $c \wedge a \neq 0$ for every $c \in F$ by assumption. If $b \notin F_a$, then there is a prime filter F' extending F_a with $b \notin F'$ (by Proposition 2.1.8). Since $F \subseteq F_a \subseteq F'$ and $a \in F'$, $b \in F'$ (by our original supposition about F), a contradiction. So $b \in F_a$. That is, there is a $c \in F$ such that $c \wedge a \leq b$. Then $c \leq a \rightarrow b$, by the semantic characterization of \rightarrow , and so $a \rightarrow b \in F$, since filters are upsets. Therefore, $F \in \widehat{a \rightarrow b}$.

¹If the closure under \wedge of the set $\{a \in A : \exists x \in X (x \leq a)\}$ is a proper subset of A , then it is a filter called *the filter generated by X* and denoted $[X]$.

Thus \mathfrak{A}_* is a general frame. It remains to show that it is descriptive. To see that \mathfrak{A}_* is refined, suppose that $\neg(FR_{\mathfrak{A}}F')$, that is $F \not\subseteq F'$. Then there is an $a \in A$ such that $a \in F \wedge a \notin F'$. So there is an $\hat{a} \in \mathcal{P}_{\mathfrak{A}}$ such that $F \in \hat{a} \wedge F' \notin \hat{a}$.

For compactness, let $\mathcal{X} \subseteq \mathcal{P}_{\mathfrak{A}}$, $\mathcal{Y} \subseteq \{W_{\mathfrak{A}} \setminus \hat{b} : \hat{b} \in \mathcal{P}_{\mathfrak{A}}\}$, and $\mathcal{X} \cup \mathcal{Y}$ have the finite intersection property. We want to show $\bigcap(\mathcal{X} \cup \mathcal{Y}) \neq \emptyset$. Let $F = [\{a : \hat{a} \in \mathcal{X}\}]$ be the filter in \mathfrak{A} generated by those $a \in A$ such that $\hat{a} \in \mathcal{X}$ and $I = (\{b : W_{\mathfrak{A}} \setminus \hat{b} \in \mathcal{Y}\})$ the ideal² generated by those $b \in A$ such that $W_{\mathfrak{A}} \setminus \hat{b} \in \mathcal{Y}$. To see that F is a proper subset of A , and hence exists, suppose not. Then there are $\hat{a}_1, \dots, \hat{a}_n \in \mathcal{X}$ such that $a_1 \wedge \dots \wedge a_n = 0$. But then $\hat{a}_1 \cap \dots \cap \hat{a}_n = \emptyset$, contradicting that $\mathcal{X} \cup \mathcal{Y}$ has the finite intersection property. Similarly, I is a proper subset since, if not, then there are $W_{\mathfrak{A}} \setminus \hat{b}_1, \dots, W_{\mathfrak{A}} \setminus \hat{b}_m \in \mathcal{Y}$ such that $b_1 \vee \dots \vee b_m = 1$. But then $\hat{b}_1 \cup \dots \cup \hat{b}_m = W_{\mathfrak{A}}$, and so $W_{\mathfrak{A}} \setminus \hat{b}_1 \cap \dots \cap W_{\mathfrak{A}} \setminus \hat{b}_m = \emptyset$, again contradicting that $\mathcal{X} \cup \mathcal{Y}$ has the finite intersection property.

So F is a filter and I is an ideal. We now show they are disjoint. Suppose $a \in F \cap I$. Then, since $a \in F$, there are $\hat{a}_1, \dots, \hat{a}_n \in \mathcal{X}$ such that $a_1 \wedge \dots \wedge a_n \leq a$. Also, since $a \in I$, there are $W_{\mathfrak{A}} \setminus \hat{b}_1, \dots, W_{\mathfrak{A}} \setminus \hat{b}_m \in \mathcal{Y}$ such that $b_1 \vee \dots \vee b_m \geq a$. So

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{a}_1 \cap \dots \cap \hat{a}_n &= a_1 \wedge \dots \wedge a_n \\ &\subseteq \hat{a} \\ &\subseteq b_1 \vee \dots \vee b_m \\ &= \hat{b}_1 \cup \dots \cup \hat{b}_m \\ &= W_{\mathfrak{A}} \setminus (W_{\mathfrak{A}} \setminus \hat{b}_1 \cap \dots \cap W_{\mathfrak{A}} \setminus \hat{b}_m). \end{aligned}$$

But then $\hat{a}_1 \cap \dots \cap \hat{a}_n \cap W_{\mathfrak{A}} \setminus \hat{b}_1 \cap \dots \cap W_{\mathfrak{A}} \setminus \hat{b}_m = \emptyset$, contradicting that $\mathcal{X} \cup \mathcal{Y}$ has the finite intersection property. So $F \cap I = \emptyset$, and we can apply the Prime Filter Theorem to get a prime filter F' of \mathfrak{A} such that $F \subseteq F'$ and $F' \cap I = \emptyset$.

It is this F' we will show to be in $\bigcap(\mathcal{X} \cup \mathcal{Y})$, completing the proof. Let $\hat{a} \in \mathcal{X}$. Then $a \in F$ by the definition of F , and so $a \in F'$ since it contains F , giving us $F' \in \hat{a}$. Now let $W_{\mathfrak{A}} \setminus \hat{b} \in \mathcal{Y}$. Then $b \in I$ by the definition of I , and so $b \notin F'$ since it is disjoint from I , giving us $F' \notin \hat{b}$ and thus $F' \in W_{\mathfrak{A}} \setminus \hat{b}$. So $F' \in \bigcap(\mathcal{X} \cup \mathcal{Y})$. Thus $\bigcap(\mathcal{X} \cup \mathcal{Y}) \neq \emptyset$, so \mathfrak{A}_* is compact and therefore a descriptive frame. \square

3.3 Back and Forth

Results analogous to the previous two lemmas hold for regular Kripke frames. But what we gain with the added generality of descriptive frames is that every Heyting algebra can be obtained from a descriptive frame via the $*$ operation, and, vice versa, every descriptive frame can be obtained from a Heyting algebra via $*$. This fact, plus some extra symmetry, is expressed by the following duality.

²An *ideal* is a nonempty, proper subset F of a Heyting algebra \mathfrak{A} such that (1) $a, b \in F$ implies $a \vee b \in F$, and (2) $a \in F$ and $a \geq b$ implies $b \in F$. The ideal generated by a set X , which is defined analogously to the filter generated by a set, but replacing \wedge by \vee and \leq by \geq , is denoted by (X) .

Theorem 3.3.1. *Let \mathfrak{A} be a Heyting algebra and \mathfrak{F} a descriptive frame. Then*

1. $\mathfrak{A} \cong (\mathfrak{A}_*)^*$,
2. $\mathfrak{F} \cong (\mathfrak{F}^*)^*$.

Proof. For part 1, we define a map $f : \mathfrak{A} \rightarrow (\mathfrak{A}_*)^*$ by

$$f(a) = \widehat{a}.$$

f is bijective since the map from a to \widehat{a} is a bijection between A and $\mathcal{P}_{\mathfrak{A}}$, which is the domain of $(\mathfrak{A}_*)^*$. The proof that f is a homomorphism is contained in the proof of Lemma 3.2.2. From that proof, we get the second equality in each of the following:

$$\begin{aligned} f(\perp) &= \widehat{\perp} & f(\top) &= \widehat{\top} \\ &= \emptyset & &= W_{\mathfrak{A}} \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} f(a \vee b) &= \widehat{a \vee b} & f(a \wedge b) &= \widehat{a \wedge b} & f(a \rightarrow b) &= \widehat{a \rightarrow b} \\ &= \widehat{a} \cup \widehat{b} & &= \widehat{a} \cap \widehat{b} & &= \widehat{a} \rightarrow \widehat{b} \\ &= f(a) \cup f(b) & &= f(a) \cap f(b) & &= f(a) \rightarrow f(b). \end{aligned}$$

So f is an isomorphism.

For part 2, we define a map $g : \mathfrak{F} \rightarrow (\mathfrak{F}^*)^*$ by

$$g(w) = \widehat{w} = \{U \in P : w \in U\}.$$

We start by showing that $g(w) \in W_{\mathfrak{F}^*}$, that is, that \widehat{w} is a prime filter of \mathfrak{F}^* . By definition, $\widehat{w} \subseteq \mathcal{P}$. Since $w \notin \emptyset$ and $w \in W$, we have $\emptyset \notin \widehat{w}$ and $W \in \widehat{w}$. Let $X, Y \in \widehat{w}$. Then $w \in X, Y$. So $w \in X \cap Y$, giving $X \cap Y \in \widehat{w}$. Now let $X \in \widehat{w}$ and $X \subseteq Y$. Then $w \in X \subseteq Y$, so $Y \in \widehat{w}$. Now let $X \cup Y \in \widehat{w}$. Then $w \in X \cup Y$. So $w \in X$ or $w \in Y$, and hence $X \in \widehat{w}$ or $Y \in \widehat{w}$. So \widehat{w} is an element of $W_{\mathfrak{F}^*}$. To see that g is injective, let $w \neq v$. Then either $\neg(wRv)$ or $\neg(vRw)$, since Kripke frames are partial orders. Without loss of generality, assume the first. Then, since \mathfrak{F} is descriptive and hence refined, there is an upset $U \in \mathcal{P}$ such that $w \in U$ and $v \notin U$. Then $U \in \widehat{w}$ and $U \notin \widehat{v}$, giving us $\widehat{w} \neq \widehat{v}$. We now show that g is a homomorphism: wRv iff every upset in \mathcal{P} containing w contains v iff $\widehat{w} \subseteq \widehat{v}$ iff $\widehat{w} R_{\mathfrak{F}^*} \widehat{v}$ (where the first equivalence holds from right to left because \mathfrak{F} is refined). To show that g is a homomorphism, we must also prove that for every $U \subseteq W$, $U \in \mathcal{P}$ iff $g(U) \in \mathcal{P}_{\mathfrak{F}^*}$. Note that $\mathcal{P}_{\mathfrak{F}^*} = \{\{\widehat{w} : w \in U\} : U \in \mathcal{P}\}$. Then $U \in \mathcal{P}$ implies $g(U) = \{\widehat{w} : w \in U\} \in \mathcal{P}_{\mathfrak{F}^*}$. And $g(U) \in \mathcal{P}_{\mathfrak{F}^*}$ implies $g(U) = \{\widehat{w} : w \in U'\}$ for some $U' \in \mathcal{P}$. But then $g(U) = g(U')$, and so $U = U'$ since g is injective. So $U \in \mathcal{P}$.

It remains to show that g is surjective. This is where that fact that \mathfrak{F} is descriptive, and compact in particular, is essential. We must show that every element of $W_{\mathfrak{F}^*}$ is of

the form \widehat{w} for some $w \in W$. So let $\mathcal{X} \in W_{\mathfrak{F}^*}$. Then \mathcal{X} is a prime filter in \mathfrak{F}^* . Then $\mathcal{Y} = \mathcal{P} \setminus \mathcal{X}$ is a prime ideal, and so $\bigcup \mathcal{Y}_0 \neq W$ for any finite subset $\mathcal{Y}_0 \subseteq \mathcal{Y}$. We will show that the set $\mathcal{X} \cup \mathcal{Y}'$ has the finite intersection property, where $\mathcal{Y}' = \{W \setminus Y : Y \in \mathcal{Y}\}$. Let $Z = X_1 \cap \dots \cap X_n \cap Y_1 \cap \dots \cap Y_m$ where each $X_i \in \mathcal{X}$, $Y_i \in \mathcal{Y}'$. Let X and Y be the intersections of the X_i and Y_i , respectively. Then $X \in \mathcal{X}$, since \mathcal{X} is a filter, and $Y \in \mathcal{Y}'$ since $W \setminus Y \in \mathcal{Y}$ (since \mathcal{Y} is an ideal). If $Z = \emptyset$, then $X \subseteq W \setminus Y \in \mathcal{Y}$. Since \mathcal{X} is a filter, this gives $W \setminus Y \in \mathcal{X}$, yielding $\mathcal{X} \cap \mathcal{Y} \neq \emptyset$, contradicting the definition of \mathcal{Y} . So $Z \neq \emptyset$, showing that $\mathcal{X} \cup \mathcal{Y}'$ has the finite intersection property. Since \mathfrak{F} is descriptive and hence compact, there is a $w \in \bigcap (\mathcal{X} \cup \mathcal{Y}')$. Finally, we show that $\mathcal{X} = \widehat{w}$. Let $U \in P$. If $U \in \mathcal{X}$, then $w \in \bigcap (\mathcal{X} \cup \mathcal{Y}') \subseteq U$, so $U \in \widehat{w}$, giving $\mathcal{X} \subseteq \widehat{w}$. Now let $U \in \widehat{w}$. So $w \in U$. Suppose $U \in \mathcal{Y}$. Then $W \setminus U \in \mathcal{Y}'$ giving $w \notin \bigcap \mathcal{Y}'$, contradicting $w \in \bigcap (\mathcal{X} \cup \mathcal{Y}')$. So $U \in \mathcal{X}$, giving $\widehat{w} \subseteq \mathcal{X}$. Thus $\mathcal{X} = \widehat{w}$, establishing that g is surjective, and therefore an isomorphism. \square

4 Completeness

This section contains the final result. Having obtained a link between the algebraic and frame-based semantics, we can obtain the more intuitive version of completeness we have been looking for.

Lemma 4.0.2. *Let \mathfrak{A} be a Heyting algebra. Then*

$$\mathfrak{A}, v \models \varphi \text{ iff } \mathfrak{A}_*, v_* \models \varphi,$$

where $v_*(p) = \widehat{v(p)}$.

Proof. We first prove that $v_*(\varphi) = \widehat{v(\varphi)}$ for all formulas by induction on φ :

PROP: $v_*(p) = \widehat{v(p)}$ by definition.

\wedge :

$$\begin{aligned} v(\widehat{\varphi \wedge \psi}) &= \widehat{v(\varphi) \wedge v(\psi)} \\ &= \widehat{v(\varphi)} \cap \widehat{v(\psi)} \\ &= v_*(\varphi) \cap v_*(\psi) \\ &= v_*(\varphi \wedge \psi) \end{aligned}$$

\vee :

$$\begin{aligned} v(\widehat{\varphi \vee \psi}) &= \widehat{v(\varphi) \vee v(\psi)} \\ &= \widehat{v(\varphi)} \cup \widehat{v(\psi)} \\ &= v_*(\varphi) \cup v_*(\psi) \\ &= v_*(\varphi \vee \psi) \end{aligned}$$

$\rightarrow:$

$$\begin{aligned}
v(\widehat{\varphi \rightarrow \psi}) &= v(\widehat{\varphi}) \rightarrow v(\widehat{\psi}) \\
&= \widehat{v(\varphi)} \rightarrow \widehat{v(\psi)} \\
&= v_*(\varphi) \rightarrow v_*(\psi) \\
&= v_*(\varphi \rightarrow \psi)
\end{aligned}$$

where the second equality of each induction step was proved in Lemma 3.2.2. Using this, we get that

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathfrak{A}, v \models \varphi &\text{ iff } v(\varphi) = \top \\
&\text{ iff } v_*(\varphi) = \widehat{\top} = \{F \subset W_{\mathfrak{A}} : \top \in F\} = W_{\mathfrak{A}} \\
&\text{ iff } \mathfrak{A}_*, v_* \models \varphi
\end{aligned}$$

since every (prime) filter is a nonempty upset and hence contains the top element \top . \square

Notice that this lemma only makes sense given the correspondence between descriptive frames and Heyting algebras proved in the previous section. Combining this lemma with the algebraic completeness theorem of §2 will give us the desired result. For a class of algebras C , we write $C_* := \{\mathfrak{A}_* : \mathfrak{A} \in C\}$.

Theorem 4.0.3. *Every intermediate logic L is sound and complete with respect to $(\mathbf{V}_L)_*$.*

Proof. Let L be an intermediate logic. Then

$$L \vdash \varphi \text{ iff } \mathbf{V}_L \models \varphi \tag{1}$$

$$\text{iff } \mathfrak{A} \models \varphi \text{ for every } \mathfrak{A} \in \mathbf{V}_L \tag{2}$$

$$\text{iff } \mathfrak{A}, v \models \varphi \text{ for every } \mathfrak{A} \in \mathbf{V}_L \text{ and valuation } v \tag{3}$$

$$\text{iff } \mathfrak{A}_*, v_* \models \varphi \text{ for every } \mathfrak{A}_* \in (\mathbf{V}_L)_* \text{ and valuation } v_* \tag{4}$$

$$\text{iff } \mathfrak{A}_* \models \varphi \text{ for every } \mathfrak{A}_* \in (\mathbf{V}_L)_* \tag{5}$$

$$\text{iff } (\mathbf{V}_L)_* \models \varphi. \tag{6}$$

(1) is just the algebraic completeness theorem from §2.2, (4) follows from the previous lemma, and the rest follow from the definition of \models . So provability in L corresponds with validity in the class $(\mathbf{V}_L)_*$. \square

Thus we have shown that every intermediate logic is complete with respect to a class of descriptive frames. That is, we have found our complete frame-based semantics.

5 Conclusion

The result from the previous section has fulfilled three goals for us. The first goal achieved is the one explicitly stated in the introduction. We have shown that a class of logics is complete with respect to an intuitively appealing semantics. Second, we have rounded out the picture of completeness results for propositional logics. We had algebraic and frame-based results for **CPC**, its extensions, and **IPC**. But we had only an algebraic result for the extensions of **IPC**. Theorem 4.0.3 gives the eighth result, completing the picture. And finally, we have seen the usefulness of analyzing the same object or phenomena from different frameworks. Through the duality result of §3, we were able to harness the power of the algebraic approach to obtain the desired intuitive frame-based result of §4.

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